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CPLR 214(5): Codling modifies Mendel by recognizing a separate
cause of action based upon strict liability in tort.
In Codling v. Paglia,19 the Court of Appeals has at least partially
overturned its notorious decision of four years earlier in Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. 20 In Mendel, the Court refused to recognize a
new cause of action in tort in favor of an injured user of a defective
product. 21 Instead, a manufacturer's liability for injury to a user of its
product with whom it was not in contractual privity was held to arise
from an extension of its implied sales warranties. Since the user's cause
of action was deemed to be contractual in nature, the Court concluded
that it accrued upon the manufacturer's original sale of the product and
was governed by the contract statute of limitations. 22 The unfortunate
result of this rule was that a plaintiff's action could be time-barred
prior to any injury.
Authorities were quick to point out that additional injustices
would flow from the Mendel decision when retailers and wholesalers
sought recovery over from manufacturers.2 3 If a sufficient interval of
time had elapsed between the manufacturer's original sale of the defective product and its distribution to the consumer, retailers and various
intermediate enterprises in the chain of distribution might find their
warranty actions against the manufacturer time-barred by the time the
defective product caused injury. In such a case, the manufacturer, who
rightfully should have borne the loss, would escape liability.
19 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973).
20 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969). The many ill effects of
Mendel are discussed in Symposium on Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 45 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 62 et seq. (1970).
2
1Previously, in Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d
81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963), the Court of Appeals had held that "[a] breach of warranty
... is not only a violation of the sales contract out of which the warranty arises but is a
tortious wrong suable by a noncontracting party .... " Id. at 436, 191 N.E.2d at 82, 240
N.Y.S.2d at 594. In Mendel, however, the Court qualified this statement, explaining that:
When Goldberg was before us, we were confronted with the issues of whether or
not a cause of action other than in negligence should exist in favor of those persons not in privity with the contract of sale. After determining that the cause of
action should exist, two avenues were open to us-either to establish, as other
jurisdictions already had, a new action in tort, or to extend our concept of implied warranty by doing away with the requirement of privity. While there is
language in the majority opinion in Goldberg approving of the phrase "strict tort
liability," it is clear that Goldberg stands for the proposition that notvithstanding the absence of privity, the cause of action which exists in favor of third-party
strangers to the contract is an action for breach of implied warranty.
25 N.Y.2d at 343-4, 253 N.E.2d at 209, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 493.
22 Under the Uniform Commercial Code, a cause of action in breach of warranty accrues upon the seller's "tender of delivery" and is governed by the four-year statute of
limitations for sales. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-725 (McKinney 1964).
23 See, e.g., Siegel, Procedure Catches Up- and Makes Trouble, 45 ST. JOHN'S L.
Rny. 63, 69-70 (1970).
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In Codling, the Court of Appeals overruled the premise upon
which Mendel was based by recognizing a separate and independent
cause of action in tort in favor of an innocent bystander injured by
a defective product. The Court set out the elements of this new cause
action as follows:
We accordingly hold that, under a doctrine of strict products liability, the manufacturer of a defective product is liable to any person injured or damaged if the defect was a substantial factor in
bringing about his injury or damages; provided: (1) that at the
time of the occurrence the product is being used (whether by the
person injured or damaged or by a third person) for the purposes
and in the manner normally intended, (2) that if the person injured or damaged is himself the user of the product he would not
by the exercise of reasonable care have both discovered the defect
and perceived its danger, and (3) that by the exercise of reasonable
care the person injured or damaged would not otherwise have
averted his injury or damages.24
While no statute of limitations issue was present in Codling, the
Court's acceptance of a tort theory of liability appears to require that
the newly recognized cause of action be deemed to accrue upon injury
to the plaintiff and that the three-year personal injury statute of limitations be applied.2 5 More difficult of assessment is Codling's effect on actions over against manufacurers by other enterprises held liable to injured plaintiffs. A lower New York court has recently had an opportunity to rule on both these issues.
In Victorson v. Kaplan,26 the plaintiff was injured while operating
an allegedly defective extractor purchased by its owner, Kaplan, from
the manufacturer, Bock Laundry Machine Co. (Bock), in 1948. In
1970, less than three years after the injury, the plaintiff brought an action in the Supreme Court, Queens County, based upon negligence,
"breach of warranty" and "strict liability in tort" against Kaplan and
Bock. Kaplan cross-claimed against Bock on each of the three grounds
relied upon by the plaintiff. Prior to the Codling decision, the court
dismissed the breach of warranty causes of action in the complaint and
cross-claim as time-barred under the Mendel rule. Also in accordance
with Mendel, the court dismissed the claims in "strict liability in tort,"
holding that these stated no separate causes of action. After Codling
was decided, the court granted reargument and, upon reargnment, al24 32 N.Y.2d at 842, 298 N.E.2d at 628-29, 845 N.Y.S.2d at 469-70.
25 It has long been established that a tort action accrues upon injury or the invasion
of a legally protected interest. See Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y.
287, 200 N.E. 824 (1936).
26 75 Misc. 2d 429, 847 N.Y.S.2d 666 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1973).
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lowed the plaintiff and Kaplan to replead their claims in "strict liability in tort," holding that these claims accrued upon injury to the plaintiff and applying the three-year statute of limitations for personal injury
to them. The court adhered to that part of its earlier decision which
held the "breach of warranty" actions time-barred.
Thus, the Victorson court treated "breach of warranty" and "strict
liability in tort" as two distinct causes of action, 27 the former sounding
in contract 28 and accruing upon sale of the product by the defendant,
the latter sounding in tort and accruing upon injury to the plaintiff.
The reluctance of the Court of Appeals in Mendel to accept the notion
of two separate causes of action was founded partially on the assumption that the sole remedy of a plaintiff who was privy to the sale of an
injury-causing product was an action based upon sales warranties. The
Court reasoned that the recognition of a separate tort action in favor of
other injured users would put a plaintiff in privity of contract at a disadvantage. 29 The latter might find his remedy barred due to the lapse

of time between the sale and his injury while a plaintiff not in privity
of contract but injured at the same time by the same defective product
would have a full three years after injury to bring an action in "strict
liability in tort." The Court in Codling, however, eliminated this objection to a dual theory of recovery by holding that a "strict liability
in tort" action accrues to "any person injured." 0 The injured user who
is in privity of contract should, therefore, have the choice of two alternative theories of recovery, each governed by its own statute of limitations and accrual rule. This reasoning is implicit in the Victorson
court's separate treatment of the "breach of warranty" and "strict liability in tort" actions.
The approach adopted in Victorson also solves the problem which
Mendel created in the area of claims over against manufacturers. The
court appears to have assumed that, although defendant Kaplan's claim
for indemnification based upon breach of warranty was barred before
27 By allowing the parties to replead their claims in "strict liability in tort" while
holding the "breach of warranty" claims time-barred, the court held contrary to the Court
of Appeals' statement in Mendel that "strict liability in tort, and implied warranty in the
absence of privity are merely different ways of describing the very same cause of action."
25 N.Y.2d at 345, 253 N.E.2d at 210, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 494.
28 Presumably the contractual action is governed by the Uniform Commercial Code
provisions such as those concerning disclaimer of warranties, limitation of remedy and
the scope of a seller's liability for personal injury. See N.Y. U.C.C. §§ 2-316, 2-719, 2-318
(McKinney 1964). A recent Court of Appeals case indicates that these provisions have no
application to an action in "strict liability in tort." Velez v. Craine & Clark Lumber Corp.,
33 N.Y.2d 117, 305 N.E.2d 750, 350 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1973) (disclaimer held ineffective as to
strangers to sales contract).
29 25 N.Y.2d at 344, 253 N.E.2d at 209, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 493.
s0 32 N.Y,2d at 342, 298 N.E.2d at 628, 45 N.Y.S.2d at 469.
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he was sued, a similar claim based upon "strict liability in tort" could
be asserted within three years of the plaintiff's injury.3 1 Under this
rule, a retailer or wholesaler held liable to an injured consumer would
be assured at least a minimum of time to assert a claim over. An alternative means of securing indemnification from a manufacturer which
the court in Victorson appears to have rejected 2 might be a claim under Dole v. Dow Chemical Co. 3 The Dole rule of equitable apportionment of damages among joint tortfeasors based upon relative responsibility has been held to apply to actions in "breach of warranty."34 A
claim for Dole indemnification accrues when the tortfeasor indemnitee
suffers judgment and is timely if asserted within six years.3 5
Undoubtedly the Court of Appeals will soon have an opportunity
to rule on the effect of the Codling case on statute of limitations problems in products liability cases. It is hoped that the Court will adopt
the approach suggested in Victorson, thus giving the law in this area a
rationality and fairness which was lacking under Mendel.
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CPLR 327: Enforceability of the judgment deemed a factor in the application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
Under Silver v. Great American Insurance Co.8 6 and its codification in CPLR 327,37 a New York court is not required to accept jurisdiction where a lawsuit's only nexus to the state is the residence of one
of the parties.38 The present standard is based upon "considerations
31 This is a reasonable extrapolation from the Codling language. The Court in Codling held that a cause of action in strict liability in tort accrues to any person "injured
or damaged." Id. This would appear to be broad enough to encompass damage resulting
from liability to an injured consumer.
32 Kaplan's claim over based upon "relative responsibility" was dismissed. 75 Misc.

2d at 43, 347 N.YS.2d at 668.
33 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
34 See Noble v. Desco Shoe Corp., 41 App. Div. 2d 908, 343 N.Y.S.2d 134 (1st Dep't
1973); Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 70 Misc. 2d 1031, 335 N.Y.S.2d 110 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1972) (mem.).
30 Cf. Musco v. Conte, 22 App. Div. 2d 121, 125-26, 254 N.Y.S.2d 589, 595 (2d Dep't

1964).
36 29 N.Y.2d 356, 278 N.E.2d 619, 328 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1972).
37 CPLR 327 provides:

When the court finds that in the interest of substantial justice the action
should be heard in another forum, the court, on the motion of any party, may
stay or dismiss the action in whole or in part on any conditions that may be just.
The domicile or residence in this state of any party to the action shall not preclude the court from staying or dismissing the action.
38 The former rule compelled the court to accept jurisdiction where either party was
a resident. De la Bouillerie v. De Vienne, 300 N.Y. 60, 89 N.E.2d 15 (1949), reargument
denied, 300 N.Y. 644, 90 N.E.2d 496 (1950) (defendant was a resident); Gregonis v. Phila-

